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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
a) Introduction
Human error is a contributing factor in some 80^ of all fatal aircraft 
accidents. Typically, human error is the result of high cockpit workload 
which is induced by a mechanical or electrical failure while the crew is 
already busy with complex air traffic control maneuvers. The possibility of 
breaking the chain of events leading to an accident is good, however, if human 
error can be reduced. In order to achieve the means for reducing, and 
eventually eliminating, human errors in commercial aircraft, a research effort 
was undertaken at the Coordinated Science Laboratory to develop the conceptual 
framework of a computer system which aids the pilot during periods of heavy 
workload. Our approach is to provide the computer system with the ability to 
selectively utilize artificial intelligence in the cockpit. That is, a highly 
sophisticated computer system would be integrated into the control and sensing 
systems of an aircraft and would be allowed to perform certain functions 
without specific instructions from the crew. It would take on a 
decision-making role, but would still remain subservient to the pilot. The 
following discusses the results of this effort.
b) Problem Studied
The objective of the first year of research was to specify the 
organization of the software system with which the pilot would interact. The 
work focussed on two related problem areas. The first was to establish a 
knowledge base containing information about all the aircraft systems and 
flight procedures. This would include information about the electrical 
system, the hydraulic system the navigation system and the engine system, in 
addition to information about takeoff, cruising and landing procedures. The 
second area of concern was how to utilize the knowledge base to provide 
continuous information about the state of the aircraft, how to reliably inform 
the pilot of potentially dangerous conditions developing, and how to provide 
suggestions for recovering from dangerous situations.
c) Results Achieved
In order to establish what kind of information was needed in the 
knowledge base, a series of interviews was conducted with pilots and crew 
members from both the Air Force and commercial airlines. There was almost 
unanimous agreement among these people that such a system would be useful to 
them. Although they differed somewhat on just what they felt should be the 
function of the system there was enough concurring opinion to provide a basis 
for the knowledge base.
All the crew members felt that the main function of the system should be 
to monitor all the aircraft instruments and to report failures in aircraft 
systems. Furthermore, they felt that correct warnings should be given to the
2pilot. That is, the system should not give inappropriate warnings such as the 
"pull up" alarm which frequently occurs on landing. They also felt that an 
electronic flight manual would be useful to speed up the look up time for 
fault recovery procedures and checklisting. Other suggestions included 
detecting trends from the norm in various flight parameters in order to 
predict impending failures or deviations from the flight course. Every pilot 
wanted to have assistance in making holding pattern and alternate landing 
calculations. Finally, they all expressed a desire to have accurate, updated 
weather information available on board.
A software system was constructed to demonstrate the artificial 
intelligence approach for implementing several of the capabilities suggested 
by the pilots. The basic function of the software system is to monitor all 
the aircraft variables and to report abnormal conditions. In doing so the 
emphasis was on providing a proper context for interpreting instrument outputs 
and through determining whether instrument outputs reflected the actual states 
of the aircraft.
A knowledge base was constructed which provided contextual information 
for monitoring and information about aircraft systems and instruments in order 
to aid the monitor in deciding the actual state of affairs onboard. 
Contextual information is represented in a system of scripts which describe 
state changes for each phase of flight. When one phase of the flight, such as 
takeoff, is completed a subsequent script is brought into the monitor. If the 
monitor detects an abnormal condition, such as an engine flameout on takeoff, 
a recovery script is brought in which reflects the standard recovery 
procedures for correcting or compensating for the situation.
A software instrument verification system was written to determine 
whether the instrument readings were consistent with each other. For 
instance, the change in altimeter reading is compared with the vertical 
velocity and the sum of the fuel flows is compared with the change in quantity 
of fuel. Likewise, VOR, ADF and DME readings are compared against each other 
for consistency.
As a developmental tool a software model of a three-engine jet passenger 
liner, similar to a DC-10, was written. This model provides a mechanism for 
generating scenarios for testing the script-based monitor during all phases of 
flight. Initial results were also obtained in modeling the functions of 
aircraft systems in order to automatically analyze system failures, imminent 
failures, and the consequences of effecting various planned actions.
d) Conclusions
We have successfully demonstrated the ability to automatically monitor 
aircraft systems in changing contexts and to verify the consistency of sets of 
instruments. The implementation of these capabilities has given us insight 
into the problem of designing a system which can diagnose faults, plan 
recovery procedures, evaluate the consequences of such plans and present 
appropriate information to the pilot. These capabilities will be studied in 
depth during the next stage of research at the Coordinated Science Laboratory.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter page
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................  1
2 FLIGHT CREW MEMBER INTERVIEWS ...........................................  3
3 AIRCRAFT MODELING ......................................................... 6
3.1 Modeling as a Development T o o l ..................................  6
3.2 Modeling as Part of the Knowledge B a s e .........................  8
4 SCRIPT-BASED MONITORING ..................................................  15
5 INSTRUMENT VERIFICATION AND FAULT ANALYSIS .............................  20
5.1 The Instrument Verification System .............................  20
5.2 Fault Detection and Diagnosis ...................................  21
6 THE SECURE SYSTEM—A WALKTHROUGH E X A M P L E .................................. 24
7 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................ 32
R E F E R E N C E S ....................................................................... 33
1 INTRODUCTION
Human error is a contributing factor in some 80% of all fatal aircraft 
accidents. Typically, human error is the result of high cockpit workload 
which is induced by a mechanical or electrical failure while the crew is 
already busy with complex air traffic control maneuvers. The possibility of 
breaking the chain of events leading to an accident is good, however, if human 
error can be reduced. In order to achieve the means for reducing, and 
eventually eliminating, human errors in commercial aircraft, a research effort 
was undertaken at the Coordinated Science Laboratory to develop the conceptual 
framework of a computer system which aids the pilot during periods of heavy 
workload. Our approach is to provide the computer system with the ability to 
selectively utilize artificial intelligence in the cockpit. That is, a highly 
sophisticated computer system would be integrated into the control and sensing 
systems of an aircraft and would be allowed to perform certain functions 
without specific instructions from the crew. It would take on a 
decision-making role, but would still remain subservient to the pilot.
The objective of the first year of research was to specify the 
organization of the software system with which the pilot would interact. The 
work focussed on two related problem areas. The first was to establish a 
knowledge base containing information about all the aircraft systems and 
flight procedures. This would include information about the electrical 
system, the hydraulic system the navigation system and the engine system, in 
addition to information about takeoff, cruising and landing procedures. The 
second area of concern was how to utilize the knowledge base to provide 
continuous information about the state of the aircraft, how to reliably inform 
the pilot of potentially dangerous conditions developing, and how to provide 
suggestions for recovering from dangerous situations.
In order to establish what kind of information was needed in the 
knowledge base, a series of interviews was conducted with pilots and crew 
members from both the Air Force and commercial airlines. There was almost 
unanimous agreement among these people that such a system would be useful to 
them. Although they differed somewhat on just what they felt should be the 
function of the system there was enough concurring opinion to provide a basis 
for the knowledge base.
All the crew members felt that the main function of the system should be 
to monitor all the aircraft instruments and to report failures in aircraft 
systems. Furthermore, they felt that correct warnings should be given to the 
pilot. That is, the system should not give inappropriate warnings such as the 
’pull up’ alarm which frequently occurs on landing. They also felt that an 
electronic flight manual would be useful to speed up the look up time for 
fault recovery procedures and checklisting. Other suggestions included 
detecting trends from the norm in various flight parameters in order to 
predict impending failures or deviations from the flight course. Every pilot 
wanted to have assistance in making holding pattern and alternate landing 
calculations. Finally, they all expressed a desire to have accurate, updated 
weather information available on board. The results of these interviews are 
described in a separate report [1] and in the quarterly reports [2,3,4,5].
2A separate study was performed to specify the architectural requirements 
for an intelligent system operating in this environment [6]. Subsequently, a 
software system was constructed to demonstrate the artificial intelligence 
approach for implementing several of the capabilities suggested by the pilots. 
The basic function of the software system is to monitor all the aircraft 
variables and to report abnormal conditions. In doing so the emphasis was on 
providing a proper context for interpreting instrument outputs and through 
determining whether instrument outputs reflected the actual states of the 
aircraft. Since the purpose of such a system is to provide Safety Enhancement 
by Computer REasoning, the system was named the SECURE system.
A knowledge base was constructed which provided contextual information 
for monitoring and information about aircraft systems and instruments in order 
to aid the monitor in deciding the actual state of affairs onboard. 
Contextual information is represented in a system of scripts which describe 
state changes for each phase of flight. When one phase of the flight, such as 
takeoff, is completed a subsequent script is brought into the monitor. If the 
monitor detects an abnormal condition, such as an engine flameout on takeoff, 
a recovery script is brought in which reflects the standard recovery 
procedures for correcting or compensating for the situation.
A software instrument verification system was written to determine 
whether the instrument readings were consistent with each other. For 
instance, the change in altimeter reading is compared with the vertical 
velocity and the sum of the fuel flows is compared with the change in quantity 
of fuel. Likewise, VOR, ADF and DME readings are compared against each other 
for consistency.
As a developmental tool a software model of a three-engine jet passenger 
liner, similar to a DC-10, was written. This model provides a mechanism for 
generating scenarios for testing the script-based monitor during all phases of 
flight. Initial results were also obtained in modeling the functions of 
aircraft systems in order to automatically analyze system failures, imminent 
failures, and the consequences of effecting various planned actions.
Section 2 describes the results of the interviews with flight crews. 
These results have motivated many of our design considerations. Section 3 
describes our investigations into the modeling of aircraft systems and flight 
dynamics in order to determine how a knowledge base should be structured to 
facilitate the reasoning capabilities of a system operating in a commercial 
airline environment. Section 4 describes script-based monitoring as a way for 
providing contextual information to the system during all phases of flight in 
both normal and abnormal conditions. Section 5 describes our efforts at 
providing the system with a means for verifying instrument data so that faults 
can be reliably detected and identified. Finally, Section 6 provides an 
example of how the SECURE system might operate to discover an impending 
failure and how it would attempt to provide the means for preventing a 
disaster resulting from the failure.
32 FLIGHT CREW MEMBER INTERVIEWS
A series of interviews was conducted with airline flight crew members and 
an Air Force pilot, and a visit was made to the United Airlines flight 
Training Center in Denver by the project members to observe flight crews 
working under simulated flight conditions. The purpose of these interviews 
was twofold. First, we wished to determine whether an intelligent onboard 
computer would be acceptable to the flight crew members. Secondly, we sought 
ideas from the flight crew members about what capabilities an onboard computer 
should have.
It was clearly recognized by all those interviewed that there are many 
non-critical flight tasks and functions which a computer can perform more 
quickly, accurately, and efficiently than people. On a general level, these 
include instrument monitoring and record keeping, making routine calculations 
of weather, energy-management, and navigational data, the storage of emergency 
and special procedures and aircraft specifications, and their retrieval on 
demand. These features can be implemented by a computer system in a 
straightforward manner so that, for instance, the flight engineer can be 
relieved of much tedious and time-consuming instrument watching. Thus, he has 
more freedom to execute higher level functions such as watching for traffic. 
Accurate and permanent records of the performance of all aircraft components 
will become available, simplifying maintenance and forestalling malfunctions. 
The accuracy and quantity of weather data will be greatly increased, improving 
the generation of flight plans, enhancing safety, and increasing fuel economy. 
A substantial beginning can be made to satisfy the universally expressed need 
for assistance and information when entering a holding pattern. In addition, 
procedures required for dealing with emergencies will be more quickly and 
easily available whenever needed. This will help to counterbalance any 
tendencies of the crew to overreact during emergencies which occur very 
infrequently because of the increased reliability of aircraft.
However, many additional functions for which a strong desire was 
expressed, such as the elimination of false alarms, the lessening the workload 
of the crew in critical situations, the diagnosis of the causes of simple and 
multiple failures, and the selection and ranking by priority of emergency and 
error-recovery procedures, require a considerably more sophisticated approach. 
It would appear that the airborne computer system must necessarily be 
intelligent, that is, it must perform in a fashion which would be considered 
to require intelligence if done by a person. It is here that the concepts of 
artificial intelligence are most relevant, and they will be extensively 
applied in the design of this system. The original intention of the designers 
was to equip the system with program intelligence, and now, after these 
interviews, it is clear that such a system would be enthusiastically welcomed 
by flight professionals also.
It became apparent from these interviews that more detailed information 
was needed concerning actual emergencies and other situations which entail 
postponement of routine tasks. There are several types of useful information 
in this area. One type concerns the circumstances which give rise to these 
situations and the conditions under which they are likely to occur. This 
knowledge, which can be obtained from further interviews and official NSTB 
accident reports, will help the system to prevent and forestall difficulties. 
A second kind of information relates to what actually happens to the aircraft
4systems in the most common emergencies. This data can be used as a basis for 
procedures that analyze the cause, or causes, of problems. Then there are the 
procedures and methods actually used in practice to cope with these 
situations. The procedures contained in airline training manuals and films 
are one source being tapped for knowledge in this area.
In order to gain first hand information about what pilots actually do 
under high workload and stress situations, we visited United Airlines Flight 
Training Center in Denver to observe flight crews during proficiency checks 
and proficiency training sessions. We observed flight crews in Boeing 727 and 
DC-8 simulators. The training scenarios included normal takeoff and landings, 
stalls, steep turns, and many simulated malfunctions. Some of these were a 
total hydraulic system failure necessitating a no flaps, no brakes landing, 
and many lesser subsystem failures such as circuit breakers popping and faulty 
indicators. In one case, the flap indicator showed that the inboard flaps had 
not deployed, and a partial hydraulic system failure was assumed. After 
following the recommended procedure for backup extension, the inboard flaps 
still indicated up. Since the backup procedure was unsuccessful, the crew 
resumed the flight according to procedures for limited flap operations. The 
instructor intervened to ask whether the flaps had indeed not extended, or 
whether the indicator had failed. When the crew did not know, he pointed out 
that the slats indicated proper extension and were on the same system as the 
inboard flaps. Thus the flaps had extended properly and it was the indicator 
that had failed, and no special flap operation was necessary. This 
demonstrated a case where an intelligent instrument verification system such 
as proposed by SECURE would have identified the problem readily and eliminated 
the improper conclusion.
A second scenario began as a low visibility daytime flight from Chicago 
to Denver, then was interrupted to practice stalls. While following further 
clearances, emergencies such as a generator failure and an engine flameout 
were simulated. Other situations practiced were low visibility approaches, 
missed approaches, unexpected autopilot shutoff, and an engine failure at 
rotation. The procedures for solving these problems are found in the manual 
in the form of a flowchart. Particularly for multiple failures, the chart 
becomes difficult to follow and incomplete when most crucial. Because most 
accidents happen from a chain of events, an intelligent computer aiding the 
pilot could provide better and more timely nonstandard procedure checklists 
and help sort out multiple failures.
A final scenario began routinely with a normal takeoff after all 
checklists were satisfied. The crew practiced entering a stall situation, 
observing the stick-shaker, and recovering properly. They continued with a 
number of instrument approaches to minimums followed by a missed approach. 
Typical emergencies encountered were an engine fire, an engine flameout, and 
an electrical bus failure causing a temporary blackout. These were usually 
handled by the first and second officers while the captain continued to fly. 
Our observers again noticed the difficulties in using the emergency 
checklists, particularly in finding the appropriate one for a multiple 
failure.
In discussions with the various crew members one of the topics was the 
problems associated with cockpit warning devices. A number of different 
visual, aural, and tactile warnings can occur and may be caused by different 
malfunctions depending on the flight regime. Due to the complexity of the
5warning signals, some confusion usually occurs and in fact, the credibility of 
the signal is sometimes questioned. Furthermore, the time and degree of 
warning needs more evaluation, because whenever a loud continuous horn 
sounded, the top priority of all three crew members seemed to be to disable 
the noise.
The time spent observing was most interesting and pertinent to our work, 
and resulted in a better understanding of the cockpit environment during 
encountered difficulties and in a better understanding of the types of 
failures and warnings that exist. The particular excess and overlap of 
warnings in present use, and the problems in sorting out failures, 
demonstrated further the need for an intelligent cockpit monitoring system.
63 AIRCRAFT MODELING
Modeling of aircraft systems was investigated from two points of view 
during the course of this project. First, modeling as a development tool acts 
as an aid to the SECURE programmers by providing the appropriate environment 
for program development and debugging. Second, modeling as a representation 
for the static and dynamic properties of aircraft subsystems is intended to be 
part of the knowledge base of the SECURE system. The purpose of this latter 
type of aircraft model is to give the SECURE system a knowledge structure with 
which it can do reasoning.
3.1 Modeling as a Development Tool
In order to assess the workability of the monitoring strategies we are 
developing, it is necessary to have a test bed on which try these ideas. The 
development tool model or aircraft simulator fulfills this function. The
simulator was designed to satisfy several criteria. These are:
1. To simulate relevant aircraft systems without excessive detail.
2. To provide modularity and ease of modification.
3. To allow faults to be introduced into the aircraft.
Set
Initial
State
Set
Fault
Pilot
Knowledge
Base
Figure 1. Diagram of the aircraft simulator.
7As the SECURE system evolves, its test bed will have to evolve also.
Thus ease of modification and modularity are important. A major thrust of the
SECURE system is to aid the pilot when the aircraft is not functioning 
properly. Therefore in order to exercise this ability the simulator should be 
able to simulate faults in the aircraft systems.
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the simulator. The pilot inputs to 
the simulator via the standard controls, elevator, aileron etc. The state 
variables reflect the simulators view of the current state of the aircraft,
i.e., position, course, fuel quantity etc. Dynamics is a set of procedures 
which are used to update the state variables. Sensors provide a mechanism for 
SECURE and the pilot to view the state of the aircraft. It should be noted 
that the sensors and the state variables may disagree if a sensor fault has
been introduced into the simulator. The experimenter has two inputs to the
simulator. He may cause apparent failures in the aircraft and he may modify 
any variable in the simulator.
The simulator roughly models a three engine commercial jet. The major 
function of the simulator is to maintain the aircraft’s position, speed and 
attitude via a simple aerodynamic model and to simulate the various engine 
parameters. The aircraft systems which are simulated are summarized below:
1. Flight
controls - aileron, elevator, flaps, speed brake
attitude - pitch, bank
speed - air speed, rate of climb
altitude - radio altimeter, barometric altimeter
2. Navigation
inertial nav. - latitude, longitude, heading 
radio nav. - VOR, DME, ADF
3. Engine
thrust
fuel - fuel flow, fuel quantity 
engine instruments - EPR, EGT, N1, N2 
engine starters
4. Miscellaneous
landing gear 
wheel brakes 
thrust reversers 
time
Faults are introduced into the simulator by breaking the update path to 
certain variables in the simulator. These variables remain at their current 
value unless changed by the action of the experimenter. For example, a 
flameout of the number one engine is introduced by failing the variable 
V_THRUST1 and then setting V_THRUST1 to zero. Similarly, the failure of the 
barometric altimeter is accomplished by failing the sensor variable S_BARALT 
and then setting S BARALT to an erroneous value.
83.2 Modeling as Part of the Knowledge Base
In contrast to the development tool aircraft model which emphasizes 
quantitative relationships, the knowledge base model emphasizes qualitative 
relationships which are useful for reasoning. This type of model abstracts a 
functional description of the aircraft rather than performing a numerical 
simulation.
We have investigated a structure called the Common Sense Algorithm (CSA) 
for representing the aircraft subsystem in the knowledge base. A CSA is a 
semantic net which has been adapted for describing the cause and effect 
relationships inherent in physical mechanisms [7,81. The basic nodes in the 
net are actions applied to the mechanism and states exhibited by the 
mechanism. The two major link types are causality and enablement i.e. 
actions cause state changes and states enable actions. Figure 2 is a summary 
of the nodes and links which may be used to construct a CSA network. A model 
of a subsystem in the aircraft is constructed by determining the actions and 
states which characterize the system and then mapping this characterization 
onto a CSA network with the appropriate structure of links and nodes.
Figure 3 shows a top level CSA description of an engine and fuel system. 
It shows that the engine may be started by the action of pushing restart 
provided the electrical bus is active. Once the engine is started, it will 
sustain itself provided there is fuel going into the engine. Figure 4 is an 
expansion of the state node S: FUEL INTO ENGINE of Figure 3. This CSA shows 
that in order to get fuel into the engine three conditions must be satisfied: 
fuel available in a tank, pump force and the fuel valve open.
CSA's have several properties which make them suitable for the knowledge 
base model. CSA’s are a very modular representation which makes it easy to 
construct and modify the knowledge base. Also the hierarchical structure 
possible with CSA’s will allow the SECURE system to reason at different levels 
of detail.
There are several potential uses of the knowledge base aircraft model in 
the SECURE system. Consequence analysis would use the model to predict the 
consequences of state changes in the aircraft. Trouble shooting would use the 
model to determine possible causes for faults which may be discovered in the 
aircraft. A planner will need a model with which to reason while constructing 
a recovery plan to get around any difficulties caused by a fault. Once a plan 
is constructed, the model may be used to check for unwanted side effects. 
These areas will be explored during the next phase of the project.
A preliminary investigation of the use of CSA’s for consequence analysis 
was performed during the final quarter. An experimental domain for a 
simplified engine system, as shown in Figure 5, was used to test this 
representation. The qualitative consequence analyzer is a procedural 
representation of the cause-effect graphs. In the graph, the nodes are facts 
that can be asserted in an associative data base. The assertions in the data 
base represent the facts known about the world. Each pair of nodes and the 
link connecting them are represented by a set of procedures. Figure 6 
illustrates the LISP procedures that represent the presence and absence of the 
assertion T: ENGINE TURN as used in Figure 3. The procedures are triggered 
when an assertion that matches their trigger pattern is asserted into the 
associative data base. The pattern matching and procedure invocation are
9Nodes
A: Action
T: Tendency
S: State
SC: State Change
L inks
.....
.....................vp
-----------------------
One shot causality 
Continuous causality 
One shot enablement 
Continuous enablement 
State couple 
State equivalence 
State antagonism 
State change threshold
Figure 2. Link types for the CSA cause-effect nets.
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Figure 3. Top level CSA description of an engine and fuel system.
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Figure 4. Expansion of state node S: FUEL INTO ENGINE.
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managed by system software. The control structure of the associative data 
base and the pattern matching procedure invocation gives a non-deterministic 
flavor where the procedures that are called reflect the semantics of the 
cause-effect graph and the state of the world as described by the assertions 
in the associative data base.
Figure 5. Simplified fuel/ignition system.
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(DEFUN ENG-T
(PROG NIL
(MES-RMV (T: NOT ENGINE TURN))
(COND ((PRESENT ’(S: FUEL INTO ENGINE)) 
(MES-ADD (S: ENGINE O N ) ))
(T (MESSAGE ’(NOT FUEL INTO ENGINE)))) 
(COND ((PRESENT f(S: NOT GENERATOR  JAMMED)) 
(MES-ADD (S: GENER ATOR ON)))
(T (MESSAGE ’(GENERATOR JAMMED))))
(COND ((PRESENT ’(S: NOT M FUEL PUMP1 JAMMED)) 
(MES-ADD (S: M FUEL PUMP 1 SPINNING)))
(T (MESSAGE ’(M FUEL PUMP 1 JAMMED)))) 
(COND ((PRESENT ’(S: NOT M FUEL PUMP2 JAMMED)) 
(MES-ADD (S: M FUEL PUMP2 SPINNING)))
(T (MESSAGE '(M FUEL PUMP2 JAMMED))))))
(DEFUN NENG-T
(PROG NIL
(MES-RMV
(MES-ADD
(MES-ADD
(MES-ADD
(MES-ADD
(T: ENGINE TURN))
(S: NOT ENGINE O N ) )
(S: NOT M FUEL PUMP1 SPINNING) )
(S: NOT M FUEL PUMP2 SPINNING) )
(S: NOT GENERATOR  ON) ) ) )
Figure 6. LISP procedures for detecting T: ENGINE TURN.
15
4 SCRIPT-BASED MONITORING
The flight crew devotes a large portion of its time to the task of 
monitoring. The advantages of having the intelligent computer system share in 
the task of monitoring are numerous. First of all, the computer monitor will 
ease the high peak workload of the flight crew. The flight crew’s workload 
rise dramatically during takeoff and landing since in a short duration of 
time, the crew executes a large number of exacting procedures. Monitoring is 
especially important here since the aircraft is in a vulnerable high-drag 
configuration. Computer assistance in monitoring would allow the crew to 
devote more attention other critical tasks. Another advantage is that when 
properly programmed, the computer monitor gives consistent high performance. 
Unlike people, the computer is not susceptible to performance degradation due 
to repetition and boredom. Also since the computer performs at a speed orders 
of magnitude faster than people, the computer monitor detects errors early and 
has sufficient computing power to perform multiple tasks and thus avoid the 
fixation problem.
Figure 7. A three level profile of a flight.
The key to monitoring lies in knowing the correct state of the airplane. 
A comparison between what the aircraft state is and what the aircraft state 
should be yields the errors. The difficulty lies in obtaining the correct 
state of the aircraft. This task is further complicated by the dynamic nature 
of the flight environment where what is correct for one situation is not 
correct for another situation. The dynamic flight environment demands that 
the computer monitor be aware of the numerous flight contexts. There seem to 
be two types of context in the flight domain. One type of context is a 
phase-based context which is of a temporal nature. The phase-based context 
reflects the highly regular characteristics of the flight as can be seen in 
Figure 7. For example, it can be expected that the takeoff roll phase follows 
the taxiing phase and precedes the climb phase. The phase-based context is 
reflected in the crew checklist where different modes are specified for 
different phases of flight. The other type of context is a condition-based 
context. Often the normal state of the aircraft or the normal procedure for 
the flight will change with the occurrence of an event that may be either 
internal or external to the airplane. For example, if there has been a 
generator malfunction, then the normal state for the bus-tie relay should be
16
open. Also when flying under gusty wind conditions, it is normal to increase 
the airspeed when maneuvering close to the ground.
It is important for the monitor to be aware of the phase-based context 
since this context defines a normal flight. We have designed a data structure 
called "script” to hold the information that describes the various phases of a 
flight [91. A script is defined below:
<script>::= ( <name>
<entry condition>
<next scripts>
<normal states>
<ranked concerns>
<checklist>
<procedure-scripts> )
<name>::= the script name.
<entry conditions:= key system parameters that signal this
context.
<next scripts>::= possible next contexts.
<normal states>::= the normal state of the aircraft. This is the
context sensitive model.
<ranked concerns>::= ordered system parameters used for conflict 
and priority resolution.
<checklist>::= explicit checklist if available.
<procedure-scripts>::=<script>*, also the sequence of contexts
that make up this script. The <script>* 
also decomposes into actions.
The script is a tree structure. At the top, the context description is 
vague. The context description becomes more precise as we progress down the 
tree. The script is also a recursive data structure. The <procedure-scripts> 
nonterminal of a given script may be composed of a sequence of scripts, which 
make up a more precise description of the present script. Thus, each context, 
represented by a script structure, may be decomposed into a sequence of more 
finely detailed contexts also represented by scripts.
Figure 7 shows all phases of a flight at three levels. The 
representation of the top level script is shown in Figure 8 and contains only 
the pointers to its three descendant scripts. One of its descendants, the 
takeoff phase, looks like Figure 9. The Takeoff-s script is necessarily vague 
since the takeoff phase covers a multitude of contexts.
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(FLIGHT-S NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
(TAKEOFF-S CRUISE-S LANDING-S))
Figure 8. The Top Level Script
(TAKEOFF-S (FUEL = MAX
ALT = 0 -> LOW)
(CRUISE-S)
(FUEL = MAX 
THRUST = 0 -> MAX 
ALT = 0 -> LOW 
GEAR = DOWN)
NIL
NIL
(START-ENGINE-S TAXIING-S 
TAKEOFF-ROLL-S CLIMB-1-S 
CLIMB-2-S))
Figure 9. A Second Level Script
The twelve third level scripts shown in Figure 7 have been implemented. 
Only the <entry condition>, <next scripts> and <normal state> fields of these 
scripts have been implemented in detail. The <checklist> and <ranked 
concerns> fields have been implemented for some of the scripts. The 
preliminary monitor tracks the context transitions and the script transitions, 
and detects errors in a context sensitive fashion [8,10,11].
The condition-based context is to be implemented through event-action 
rules. These rules will implement the irregular, though frequently occurring, 
events that either alter the normal state of the aircraft or the normal 
procedure for the flight. Examples of such rules are the following:
1. generator malfunction -> bus tie relay open.
2. gusty wind condition -> increased airspeed when maneuvering 
close to the ground.
The emergency procedures for the aircraft can be implemented through these 
event-action rules. A data base of the emergency procedures and other flight 
knowledge should prove to be very useful.
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Figure 10. Block diagram of the run time system.
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The preliminary monitor system consists of the modules shown in 
Figure 10. The system presently consists of four programs running 
concurrently under time-sharing. The system environment is described by a 
state vector that describes the aircraft's internal systems and its trajectory 
in 3-D space. The state vector manager updates the vector and sends out the 
state vector to the monitor and the display program. The display program 
outputs the pertinent state vector entries on a terminal screen so that the 
human observer can determine the present flight environment. The monitor 
periodically scans the state vector and checks for context transitions and 
system errors as defined by the scripts in the script data base. The fault 
insertion program causes faults in the system by altering the state vector. 
Presently, the flight environment is updated by the fault insertion program. 
An aircraft simulator has been completed, but it is not linked to the system 
yet. All communications to the state vector manager are routed through the 
IPCF facility in the T0PS-10 operating system for the CSL PDP-10 computer.
Other components that will be needed in the knowledge base are
representations of flight techniques, meta-scripts, and translation rules 
between abstraction levels. Flight technique knowledge consists of
descriptions of control surface movements and their effects on the aircraft 
and the aircraft trajectory. Meta-scripts are the goals the aircraft should 
attain during the flight and the reasons for the correct aircraft behavior. 
Meta-scripts are used as the starting points of script generation. 
Translation rules are necessary to map the abstract meta-scripts to the
concrete scripts during script generation. The number of abstraction levels 
between the meta-scripts and the scripts are still not determined presently. 
In addition to the extended knowledge base a planning system will be designed 
to map the abstract meta-scripts to the concrete aircraft actions and the
associated aircraft system states.
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5 INSTRUMENT VERIFICATION AND FAULT DIAGNOSIS
The primary functions that a computer can perform in the cockpit are to 
monitor instruments, to detect abnormal readings, and to interpret the faults. 
Efforts this past year focussed on designing methods for distinguishing 
problems which are either caused by faulty instruments or by malfunctions of 
the mechanical components, in contrast to those that are caused by improper 
flight operations. We investigated the problems related to instrument 
monitoring, and the strategies to detect and diagnose faults.
The approach we took was to define a system which first verifies the 
consistency of instrument readings. If they are consistent with either normal 
or abnormal readings, the system hypothesizes that the instruments are 
functioning properly. Hence, if the readings in this situation are abnormal, 
most likely an aircraft subsystem is malfunctioning. On the other hand, if 
the instrument readings show inconsistencies, the system hypothesizes that at 
least one instrument is likely to be faulty. When it is verified that the 
instruments are functioning, the script-based monitor will detect system 
malfunctions which must be further analyzed.
5.1 The Instrument Verification System
The Instrument Verification System ell’s) was designed to reflect the 
following considerations. First, whenever the IVS detects an inconsistency in 
instrument outputs, it should attempt to indicate to the pilot possible 
sources for the trouble instead of to merely give him a general warning. 
Secondly, since it is not always possible for the IVS to immediately determine 
whether a change in an instrument output is due to a failure in the instrument 
(in which case the output of the instrument would be inconsistent with other 
instruments) or whether it is due to a change in the state of an aircraft 
system (in which case the output would be consistent with those of the other 
instruments), a delayed observation may be necessary to provide second order 
information to decide the consistency of the instruments. Finally, since it 
is intended that the computer help the pilot by reducing his workload, rather 
than burdening him with heavy man-machine communication, a troubleshooting 
strategy that requires pilot cooperation should not be applied unless all 
other strategies fail..
An approach which utilizes five strategies was investigated as a solution 
to verifying instrument outputs. The relations among the five strategies are 
shown in Figure 11. Inconsistencies are detected by comparing different 
estimates of flight parameter values. When a comparison is inconclusive, the 
verifier can either use related instruments to confirm the consistency of the 
instruments, or it can initiate a delayed observation to collect extra 
information. When an inconsistency is noted, the verifier attempts to locate 
faulty instruments with related-instrument confirmation, delayed observation, 
or even with the help of the pilot.
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Figure 11. Organization of the Instrument Verification System.
5.2 Fault Detection and Diagnosis
In order to automatically detect mechanical faults, to identify their 
types and to automatically propose recovery procedures, a fault detection and 
diagnosis system was formulated. The basic functions of the fault detection 
and diagnosis system (FDD) are the following (see Figure 12). Fault detection 
is done by continuously scanning scanning the cockpit instruments and 
annunciators. When abnormal indications are discovered, the process of 
confirmation and diagnosis is triggered.
Mechanical faults can be detected if the FDD knows what an instrument is 
supposed to read at a particular moment. The normal references can be 
provided by the performance model of each subsystem. Such models can provide 
current monitoring references such as continuous values of subsystem 
parameters that vary in response to certain control variables and sequences of 
check points observed from previous operations.
In confirming the instrument readings, the FDD distinguishes between 
instrument malfunctions and component malfunctions by searching the 
descriptions of mechanical faults in the knowledge base for those whose 
symptoms match the detected fault pattern. The FDD then monitors the readings 
of other instruments in an attempt to find some secondary effect which can 
identify the fault. If no further abnormality is observed within a reasonable
22
Figure 12. Aircraft fault diagnosis and recovery planning system.
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period of time, the FDD assumes that the detected problem is an instrument 
fault rather than an indication of component failure. This is the strategy to 
avoid most of the false alarms.
In an emergency situation, the most important consideration is to 
guarantee the safety of the aircraft. In some instances it may be possible 
for the FDD to suggest a sequence of actions, the purpose of which is to 
ensure safety of flight even though the fault may not yet have been diagnosed. 
The FDD, in this case, confirms the abnormal instrument reading by the 
"wait-and-see" strategy only for an allowed safe period. Then it continues by 
proposing a procedure that can maintain the control and the essential 
functions of the aircraft.
When the FDD identifies the cause of the detected problem, it utilizes 
the subsystem functional description in the knowledge base to formalize a 
recovery plan. The proposed plan can be verified by the consequence analyzer 
to make sure that it will achieve the desired function, and will not induce 
other harmful side-effects.
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6 THE SECURE SYSTEM—A WALKTHROUGH EXAMPLE
The outcome of our efforts during this year is the conceptual design of 
an onboard computer system which is knowledgeable about all the aircraft 
systems, the flight procedures and about how to recover from inflight 
difficulties. The top level organization of this system is shown in 
Figure 13. Central to the system is the knowledge base which has both 
descriptive and procedural knowledge about the aircraft systems. The 
script-based monitor detects deviations from normal, both in flight paths and 
in system malfunctions. The trend analyzer detects progressive deviations 
from the normal flight parameters and warns the monitor of impending failures. 
Once significant deviations are detected, the fault diagnoser determines the 
cause of the difficulty and predicts the consequences of allowing the 
situation to remain. Once the fault has been diagnosed the plan generator 
constructs a recovery procedure and "debugs” the plan by invoking the 
consequence analyzer.
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In order to see how the SECURE system would operate in a real time 
environment, consider first the following situation which could occur onboard 
an aircraft without the SECURE system. Figure 14 is a schematic of the 
lubrication system to one of the engines of a DC-10 [12]. Oil is pumped into 
the engine. It flows through the engine, cooling it in the meantime, and 
continues from the engine into a filtering system. After the oil is filtered, 
it enters a heat exchanger where it is cooled before entering a reservoir tank 
from which it is again pumped to complete the cycle. The state of the oil 
system is monitored by the pressure gauges, the temperature gauge and the oil 
quantity gauge.
TIME
Figure 15. Engine oil temperature profile indicating potential difficulties.
Assume that during a flight of a DC-10, in the oil system for the number 
three engine a slow buildup of dirt occurs in the return line from the engine 
somewhere before the oil temperature sensor is connected. This will slowly 
restrict the oil flow and cause a slow pressure increase which may not be 
noticed by the flight engineer. The situation is indicated in Figure 15. 
Eventually the line closes up so that there is no fuel flow. The only 
indications will be that of an elevated pressure, but this levels off at some 
value due to a pressure release mechanism in the oil pump. The result of this 
is that the oil in the engine will heat up, bake and then lose its 
lubrication. The number three engine will seize.
Since each of the engines turns an electrical generator, the following 
sequence occurs. Looking at Figure 16, it is apparent that the power to the 
number three bus will be cut off so that immediately 50% more power will be 
demanded from generators 1 and 2 [13]. To complicate matters further, assume 
that this creates an overload on both generators and that the circuit breaker 
on bus 2 is stuck shut. The result is that the only circuit breaker on bus 1
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Figure 16. Schematic of the DC-10 electrical system. ^
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kicks off so that the full electrical power demand for the aircraft is from 
the number 2 generator. In the worst case, the surge demand will cause the 
generator rotors to halt, the gears in the number 2 engine accessory box will 
strip, causing the failure of the number 2 engine. The situation is now that 
there are two engines out, no electrical power and the loss of two hydraulic 
systems. Figure 17 shows what control is lost through the loss of the 
hydraulics. The buildup of a clog in the oil line has led to catastrophic 
results.
The SECURE system would function in the following manner to anticipate 
and counter these developments. The trend analyzer would detect the change in 
the oil pressure and would notify the script-based monitor of the fact even 
though the pressure is still within normal limits. The monitor would assume a 
potential fault and invoke the fault diagnoser. The fault diagnoser would 
utilize a cause-effect net for the oil system. Figure 18 shows how such a 
cause-effect net might be structured. Looking at the figure, it is apparent 
that an increase in oil pressure could be caused by either an increase in the 
pump speed or a decrease in the effective cross section of the oil line. A 
decrease in the cross section of the oil line is caused by an obstruction in 
the oil flow path. At this point the fault diagnoser can pose three 
hypotheses:
H1: There is a transient increase in the oil pressure.
H2: The oil pump has increased in speed.
H3: there is an obstruction in the oil line.
The diagnoser then would attempt to determine which of the above is the case. 
It would use further reasoning to set up a set of monitoring procedures to 
determine whether one of the hypotheses is correct. To determine whether H1 
is correct it would use a rule stating that an increase in pressure will be 
followed within a computed period of time by a decrease in oil pressure. 
Hence, it would set up a test to monitor the oil pressure to determine whether 
the oil pressure will decrease within this period of time.
To confirm the second hypothesis, it would refer to its knowledge of the 
relationship between the increase in engine speed and the increase in pump 
speed. If the engine speed increases, then it is normal that the pump speed 
increase and level off, so that the oil pressure will level off. Hence, the 
test generated is to monitor the pressure to determine if the pressure levels 
off at an acceptable level. To determine whether the this hypothesis is the 
case, the fault diagnoser invokes the consequence analyzer to examine the 
consequences of an obstruction in the oil line. The consequence analyzer 
would use the cause-effect net to set up the test. First, the consequence 
analyzer would reason that if the state S: OBSTRUCTION IN OIL FLOW PATH is
the case, then the state S: NO OBSTRUCTION IN OIL FLOW PATH is not the case
and hence, the state S: UNOBSTRUCTED FLOW PATH is not true. For the state
change SC: OIL FLOW to be true, the three conditions, that the oil pressure
be positive, the oil quantity be normal and there be an unobstructed flow 
path, must be simultaneously true. The consequence analyzer will return this 
information to the fault diagnoser which sets up tests to monitor the oil 
quantity, which should remain constant, and the oil pressure, which would 
reverse its trend. The consequence analyzer looks further in the cause-effect 
net to determine that if the oil flow decreased, or stops that the tendency to
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cool the engine will decrease and hence, the engine temperature will increase. 
This information is returned to the fault diagnoser which sets up a further 
test to monitor the EGT. If the EGT increases, there could be an engine 
failure.
The fault diagnoser, in addition to setting up these tests returns the 
three hypotheses to the script-based monitor. The script-based monitor then 
invokes the plan generator to set up a set of contingency recovery procedures 
to cover the three cases.
For the first hypothesis, the plan generator will suggest doing nothing 
if the trend in pressure reverses and all other parameters remain unchanged, 
or within limits. It then tests this plan by calling on the consequence 
analyzer which refers to the cause-effect net to determine whether any 
undesirable state changes can result from this inaction. FOR the second 
hypothesis, the plan generator will generate the plan to decrease the engine 
speed and then invoke the consequence analyzer. In this case the consequence 
analyzer determines from the cause-effect net of Figure 18 that the procedure 
will result in no increase in engine temperature. However, it must examine 
other cause-effect nets to determine whether other problems could develop. 
For instance, if two engines are already gone, this may not be the proper 
action. If the plan holds up, it informs the plan generator of that fact.
For the third hypothesis, one of the possibilities is that an engine 
failure is imminent. The plan generator might suggest a decrease in engine 
speed to idling speed and suggest alternatives in the flight procedures. 
Again with the consequence analyzer the plan generator determines whether this 
plan will have unsafe consequences.
After generating the set of plans the plan generator informs the monitor 
of the set of alternatives, Once the fault diagnoser gets confirmation on the 
tests it has set up, it informs the script-based monitor of the situation. 
The monitor then informs the pilot of the situation and suggests to him the 
appropriate set of alternative plans.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
We have successfully demonstrated the ability to automatically monitor 
aircraft systems in changing contexts and to verify the consistency of sets of 
instruments. The implementation of these capabilities has given us insight 
into the problem of designing a system which can diagnose faults, plan 
recovery procedures, evaluate the consequences of such plans and present 
appropriate information to the pilot. These capabilities will be studied in 
depth during the next stage of research at the Coordinated Science Laboratory.
Most of our efforts this year were directed toward the establishing of a 
knowledge base for the SECURE system. The knowledge we felt necessary to 
include in the knowledge base is both descriptive and procedural knowledge of 
the aircraft systems, flight dynamics and flight procedures. We examined the 
Common-Sense Algorithm for representing the mechanical system for an aircraft 
and found it to be useful in question-answer systems. For instance, the 
consequence of mechanical failures or the effects of changing states in a 
mechanical system can be analyzed by tracing through the CSA structures. Used 
in such a manner, CSA’s can be useful for diagnosing faults insofar as they 
adequately represent a mechanical system. Unresolved questions arise as to 
how much detail is necessary in a CSA to sufficiently represent a system. 
Also, are there better representations for mechanical systems than that 
afforded by CSA’s?
Further questions arise as to how CSA’s can be used for fault recovery 
planning. Can a system of CSA’s adequately connect a high level plan with a 
set of discrete, low-level actions on the mechanical systems? Are there other 
systems of models more suited to the planning environment? Is there some 
advantage to be gained by hierarchically structuring plans so that a smooth 
top-down approach can be achieved to planning recovery procedures? How would 
such a hierarchy be organized? How many levels are necessary and what 
relationships exist between the various levels? These questions form the 
basis for our investigations during the second phase of this project.
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